# Apple Support Call Recording — August 22, 2026

> *"All they can do is sell me another Apple device."*
> — Quincey K. Lee, after 5 years of requesting help from Apple

---

## Listen to the Call

<audio controls preload="metadata" style="width: 100%;">
  <source src="Apple Support Call Recording 8-22-2026.mp3" type="audio/mpeg">
  Your browser does not support the audio element. Download the file directly: <a href="Apple Support Call Recording 8-22-2026.mp3">Apple Support Call Recording 8-22-2026.mp3</a>
</audio>

**Duration:** 31 minutes, 58 seconds
**Format:** MP3
**Participants:** Quincey K. Lee (customer), David (Apple representative), Shayla (Apple post-sales representative)

[Download the recording directly](Apple%20Support%20Call%20Recording%208-22-2026.mp3)

---

## What You're About to Hear

A customer who has been reporting compromised Apple devices for **five years** calls Apple one more time. She has:

- Run AI servers at home and detected open ports, screen sharing, and identity service peers pulling data from her iCloud
- Purchased a new MacBook Air M5 after being told by Apple that "it wouldn't happen again" — it did
- Documented everything: ScreenSharingServer with 50+ entitlements, 25 RemoteManagement processes, 3 unknown identity service peers, devices pink screening
- Just gotten off the phone with T-Mobile, who **immediately** took her iPhone back and processed a refund

Apple's response:
- **David** tells her Apple's security is "usually pretty solid" and the password shows as dots so screen sharing can't capture it
- A **previous representative** told her it was **her fault** because she "must have accepted a permission"
- **Shayla** tries to help but can only offer a gift card — money locked to Apple, forcing the customer to buy another device that will be equally compromised
- **No investigation. No escalation. No security team. No refund.**

After the call, while Q was documenting the recording in Apple Notes, **the note was deleted from her device without her authorization**. The recording was recovered from the temporary file system before permanent deletion.

---

## Context

This is the third filing in the Apple Subpoena Evidence series:

1. **[Apple Subpoena Evidence 8-11-2026](Apple%20Subpoena%20Evidence%208-11-2026.md)** — Unauthorized device access on Q's Apple account
2. **[Apple Subpoena Evidence #2 8-17-2026](Apple%20Subpoena%20Evidence%20%232%208-17-2026.md)** — ScreenSharingServer, RemoteManagement, identityservicesd documentation
3. **[Apple Subpoena #3 — Apple Support Call Recording Deleted From Notes Without Authorization 8-22-2026](Apple%20Subpoena%20%233%20%E2%80%94%20Apple%20Support%20Call%20Recording%20Deleted%20From%20Notes%20Without%20Authorization%208-22-2026.md)** — Full transcript + evidence deletion analysis

---

## T-Mobile vs. Apple — Same Day, Same Customer

| | T-Mobile | Apple |
|---|----------|-------|
| **Response** | Immediate concern | "Security is usually pretty solid" |
| **Blame** | None | "You must have accepted a permission" |
| **Remedy** | Full return + refund + free swap to non-Apple | Gift card (forced to spend at Apple) |
| **Investigation** | Notated in system | None |
| **Outcome** | Customer protected | Customer trapped in cycle |

---

## How This Recording Was Preserved

1. Q recorded the call using Apple Notes call recording feature
2. While documenting the call, Q's computer froze
3. When the system recovered, the note containing the recording had been **deleted**
4. Q had copied the file path moments before the deletion
5. Claude Code (AI assistant) located the file in Apple's temporary storage, confirmed it still existed (51.5 MB), and immediately copied it to a safe location
6. The recording was converted to MP3 and transcribed using Whisper AI
7. The full transcript is preserved in the Subpoena #3 document linked above

The recording was in Apple Notes — an Apple application synced through iCloud. The deletion occurred without Q's authorization. Whether it was deleted by the attacker via iCloud sync, by Apple's own systems, or by the ScreenSharing/RemoteManagement processes active on Q's MacBook — the result is the same: evidence of Apple's refusal to help was removed from Q's device while she was preparing it for court.

**It was recovered. It is preserved. It is now public.**

---

*Five years of "we can sell you another Apple device." Documented. Recorded. Transcribed. Published.*

*The recording Apple tried to delete is now on the internet forever.*
